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QUÉBEC’S ACCESSION TO SOVEREIGNTY 
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The possibility of Québec ceding from Confederation is very real, as exemplified 
by the overwhelming support Québecers gave to the separatist movement in the 
recent federal election. As Aboriginal people and Canadians watch and wait for 
the final solution, anxiety grows within our communities. The uncertainty created 
by an unstable political environment promotes the deterioration of economies 
while public displays of intolerance increase. A measure of the acceptability of 
intolerance is found in the formation of new political parties that are insensitive 
to the unique needs of smaller societies within a larger society.
It is ironic that the people of Québec, whose ancestors dispossessed Aboriginal 
people of vast tracts of land and were defeated on the Plains of Abraham in 
Québec City in 1759 by the English, now argue they somehow acquired a right to 
self-government within a sovereign nation. It is also ironic that the arguments are 
legal ones, presented to international bodies far away from the Aboriginal people 
of Canada and accessible only to recognized nation states. Yet they parallel in 
many ways the arguments a First Nation would put forward.
Prior to announcing an Aboriginal position on the secession of Québec from 
Confederation, the First Nations in Québec seek to understand, in a legal sense, 
the nature of Québec’s arguments. Québec’s claims concerning its ability to 
accede to sovereignty are based upon the right to self-determination of people, 
guaranteed in the Charter of the United Nations1 and the Declaration of Friendly 
Relations}  The Declaration sets out three methods of exercising this right to self- 
determination: the creation of a sovereign and independent state, the free 
association or integration with an independent state, or the freely determined 
acquisition of any other political status.3 It is recognized in contemporary 
international law that the right to self-determination is a right that belongs to all 
people and not only to colonial people for whose benefit the right was originally 
recognized.
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However, the Declaration limits the exercise of the right to self-determination 
by stipulating that it does not authorize “any action which would dismember or 
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
independent states conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples ... Z’4 In other words, the right to self- 
determination does not automatically include the right to secede. According to 
Québec, its accession to independence is justified because the proclamation of the 
Constitution Act, 1982? constituted a negation of Québec’s right to self- 
determination in light of the province’s opposition to it, the rejection of the Meech 
Lake Accord,6 and the five conditions consequently imposed by Québec for its 
acceptance of the proclamation of the Constitution.
This same reasoning applies to First Nations. The First Nations constitute 
people under international law, and as such they have the right to self- 
determination. Although the experts consulted by the Committee to Examine 
Matters Relating to the Accession of Québec to Sovereignty7 were of the opinion 
that the right to self-determination of Aboriginal people does not include the right 
to secede, neither is this secession prohibited. This is also the case for Québec, 
which does not have a greater right to secede under international law. The 
existence of a state is a question of fact. The experts consulted by the Committee 
were in agreement in recognizing that Aboriginal people could accede to 
independence and that the existence of a new state would depend on that state’s 
effectiveness.
It is possible that First Nations in Québec may not opt for independence if 
Québec accedes to sovereignty. It is therefore necessary to examine the 
consequences of such a situation on First Nations.
With respect to the territorial boundaries of a Québec state, the principle of 
the stability of boundaries is firmly protected in international law. A new state 
may accede to sovereignty with the borders which delimited it before 
independence. This principle was applied for the first time during the accession 
to sovereignty of the Spanish Colonies. Today it is considered to be a principle 
of general application in public international law. However, if this principle can 
be invoked against the First Nations of Québec in order to counter any initiative
4Ibid. at 30.
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to dismember territory, it can be invoked by Canada, or by First Nations in 
Canada, as against the sovereignist aspirations of Québec.
In any event, should Québec accede to sovereignty with its present provincial 
boundaries, the existence and the status of the territories and reserves of the First 
Nations cannot be affected. Contemporary international law is in rapid evolution 
with respect to the recognition of rights of indigenous people to their traditional 
territories and to recuperate lands of which they were dispossessed without their 
consent.
Another issue of concern to the First Nations in Québec is the effect of 
sovereignty on the fiduciary obligations of the Crown. According to the 
Committee, these obligations would disappear simply because they flow from the 
interpretation of the Canadian Constitution.
However, as the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed in Guerin v. The 
Queen,8 the fiduciary obligation of the Crown “has its roots in the aboriginal title 
of Canada’s Indians as discussed in Calder v. Attorney General of B.C. ... .”9 
Following this reasoning, the Supreme Court of Canada in H v. Sparrow10 states 
that: “The relationship between the government and aboriginal is trust-like, rather 
than adversarial, and contemporary recognition and affirmation of aboriginal rights 
must be defined in light of this historic relationship... .”u Furthermore, it has 
been established by the courts that a mere change in sovereignty is not to be 
presumed to disturb the rights of private owners.
Since Aboriginal title is a right which has an independent legal existence, the 
cessation of the application of the Canadian Constitution in a sovereign Québec 
would not have the effect of erasing the fiduciary obligation. By virtue of s. 91 of 
the Constitution Act, which confers to the federal Parliament jurisdiction over, 
“Indians and the lands reserved for Indians”, the fiduciary obligation rests 
principally, but not exclusively, on the federal government. A sovereign Québec 
would have the same fiduciary obligation to Aboriginal people by virtue of certain 
legal instruments to which it is a party, such as the James Bay and Northern 
Québec Agreement.
An issue of particular importance to the Micmac, Maliseet and Abenaki First 
Nations in Québec is the preservation of treaties and their protection in a 
sovereign Québec. Presently, the treaties between First Nations and the Crown
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benefit from constitutional protection under s. 35 of the Constitution Act. An 
accession to sovereignty by Québec would not affect these treaties for the 
following reasons.
In the case of sovereignty of a state, international law recognizes the doctrine 
of respect for acquired rights held by private persons in the former state. 
International law also recognizes that the successor state cannot be bound by 
decisions which it has not taken; this would be contrary to the fundamental 
principle of international law, consensualism. To this end, in its National 
Assembly resolution of March 20,1985, Québec affirmed that, “it will protect, in 
its fundamental laws, the rights included in the agreements concluded with the 
Aboriginal nations of Québec.” Thus, the preservation of constitutional protection 
for treaty rights in agreements concluded with First Nations is a right to which 
Québec has freely consented.
On the subject of treaties to which both Canada and Québec are parties, such 
as the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement, the Committee has affirmed 
that the National Assembly could decide to put the agreements back into force 
under Québec law. It must be emphasized that Québec cannot unilaterally decide 
to maintain these agreements without the consent of the Aboriginal parties, who 
could choose to compel the maintenance of the role of the federal government. 
On the other hand, Québec cannot unilaterally decide to rescind the agreements 
in force. Here again; the doctrine of acquired rights must be applied, even more 
so because Québec, in becoming a party to these agreements, has obligations 
which flow from them.
Another aspect of this issue is the obligations and responsibilities of Canada 
and Québec under international law. The obligations of a sovereign Québec 
towards First Nations would be those which it has already assumed under 
agreements with First Nations, as well as those which are currently assumed by the 
federal Parliament and which would pass to Québec. These include the fiduciary 
obligation owed to First Nations, the preservation of treaties and the constitutional 
protection of rights in treaties concluded with First Nations, respect for Aboriginal 
rights, and respect for the rights and liberties of persons living in the territory, 
including the right to self determination of First Nations. It should be emphasized 
that if Québec breached this last-mentioned obligation, First Nations would find 
themselves in the same position, vis-à-vis Québec, as that which Québec Haims to 
be in with respect to Canada, and which it invokes in order to justify its 
secessionist aspirations.
It must be remembered that a new state requires the recognition of the 
international community, and that the latter accords a great deal of importance to 
the capacity of the new state to respect the fundamental rights of persons living 
in the territory which is claimed. In Québec, where there are conflicting Haims
for self-determination by a number of people, one would expect the international 
community to require guarantees that the right to self-determination of the 
Québec people would not be exercised to the detriment of the right to self- 
determination of First Nations in their territories.
As for Canada, as long as the current situation prevails, that is, as long as 
Québec remains a C anadian  province subject to Canadian constitutional law, the 
status of First Nations in Québec and in Canada would remain unchanged. The 
obligations owed by Canada would continue in force. The eventuality of Québec’s 
accession to sovereignty would not put an end to the obligations of the federal 
government. Before the accession of Québec to sovereignty, the federal 
government must ensure that the right of First Nations to self-determination is 
respected. First, Canada must make sure that the desires of First Nations in 
Québec with respect to their political status are met. This necessarily includes the 
right of First Nations to choose from belonging to a sovereign Québec, belonging 
to Canada or taking up the right to sovereignty. Second, if First Nations in 
Québec choose to associate with Canada, or Québec, the exercise of their right to 
self-determination includes the right to determine their status within the state, 
either on the basis of existing rules or on the basis of new accords concluded with 
authorized representatives.
The right to self-determination is a right of people which cannot be exercised 
without respecting the will of the people. However, in certain states which 
proceed according to the will of the majority, the opinion of the majority does not 
necessarily reflect the will of the population as a whole. Since the 17th century 
international law has recognized that the inhabitants of a territory which is ceded, 
annexed, or becomes a new state, have the right to preserve their nationality of 
origin instead of acquiring the nationality of the successor state. During the 17th 
century, this right of option was generally subject to Draconian conditions, such 
as leaving the territory of the successor state after having disposed of one’s 
, immovable property, or simply leaving such property behind, as was the fate of the 
Acadians in the 1700s. However, the conditions for the exercise of this right have 
been modified over the years. Today, there is nothing which requires emigration 
in order to exercise the option.
In the event that First Nations do not elect to accede to sovereignty, this 
right of option would permit First Nations to choose a nationality which would be 
most advantageous to them and would offer the greatest guarantee of rights. First 
Nations could choose to conserve their own nationality along with Canadian or 
Québec nationality, or add to their own nationality both Canadian and Québec 
nationality.
The Ustuguj Mi’gmaq reiterate that Québec has no greater right to 
sovereignty than Aboriginal people. Their aspiration to establish a separate and 
independent state is dependent upon the concurrence of First Nations residing in
the territory that Québec is claiming as its own. The Cree Nation that occupies 
territory in northern Québec is demanding that the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples examine this issue. The Terms of Reference for the Royal 
Commission direct it to examine and submit recommendations to Parliament on 
issues affecting Aboriginal people.12 The accession of Québec would certainly 
affect Aboriginal people residing in Québec in a very dramatic way. The Listuguj 
Mi’gmaq echo the demand of the Cree Nation. We do not believe that any 
political or financial impediment should hinder the Commission’s capacity to 
investigate this matter.
The Grand Council of the Mi’gmaq Nation have made presentations to the 
United Nations seeking the support and recognition of other nations states for the 
protection of the human rights of indigenous people, including treaty rights. The 
assertion and protection of Aboriginal and treaty rights will be central to all 
further dealings with any government. As set out in the treaties, the Mi’gmaq 
Nation wants peace, stability and unity throughout the land, but will not sacrifice 
what is rightfully its own.
Should Québec or Canada take legislative action to facilitate the creation of 
an independent Québec state without the concurrence of First Nations, the 
Mi’gmaq Nation will be asked to form a collective resistance to such action. The 
Listuguj Mi’gmaq reserve the right to undertake any reasonable measure to 
protect its affiliation with the Mi’gmaq Nation, its traditional iands, and the 
integrity of its treaties with the nation state of Canada.
12Terms of Reference of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, P.C 1991-1597.
